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Abstract. Louise Arbour presents a pleasant picture of international society in her article on
‘Responsibility to protect’ (R2P) as a ‘duty of care’ – one where states not only have a moral
responsibility but also a legal responsibility to intervene in some of the worst situations on
the planet. However, this argument is misleading and based on faulty legal assumptions
which pose significant problems for Arbour’s case. This response will argue that upon
examination, Arbour’s legal case is not very strong or persuasive. Even more importantly,
even if we accepted Arbour’s legal arguments, it would not make much of a diﬀerence to
how states respond to international crises. Arbour seems to misunderstand that the problems
facing R2P have always been those of ‘will’ and not law – and this must be understood as
a political rather than legal problem.
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It is with some trepidation that one challenges the understanding of both
international law and politics of a former prosecutor of an international criminal
tribunal, but the intention of this article is to do just that. Certainly, Arbour paints
a nice picture in her article on ‘The responsibility to protect’ (R2P); a world where
states not only recognise that the international community has a duty to protect
their own citizens and the citizens of other countries from war crimes and genocide
– but also that there may in fact be a legally enforceable duty to do so. In fact,
no one is allowed to claim the status of ‘impotent and powerless bystander’.1 Yet,
bursting this bubble of legal optimism is the fact that her arguments are based on
legal assertions which are questionable or, at the very least, a problematic
assessment of the politics of international law. Again, given Arbour’s pedigree, I
do not say this lightly. However, Arbour’s contentions create a gap between
* I would like to thank Professor Chris Brown and two reviewers for their helpful comments on this
response.
1 Louise Arbour, ‘The responsibility to protect as a duty of care in international law and practice’,
Review of International Studies, 34 (2008), pp. 445–58, 445.
Review of International Studies (2010), 36, 47–54  2010 British International Studies Association
doi:10.1017/S0260210511000088
47
understandings, expectations and capabilities (including willingness) so great as to
cast a shadow over her legal thought-experiment.
This article will make three challenges to Arbour’s assertion that states may
have signed up for a legally-liable responsibility to protect. First, that legally there
is no obligation and Arbour is incorrect to rely so heavily on the 1948 Genocide
Convention and the recent International Court of Justice’s (ICJ) 2007 decision in
Bosnia-Herzegovinia vs. Serbia and Montenegro (Bosnian Genocide Case).2 Second,
even if such an obligation could be construed, it would not be a helpful or useful
tool of international politics for R2P advocates because it does not help us answer
the hard questions of R2P. Third, while there needs to be more research and
academic commentary on R2P, this research is best done with a ‘responsibility to
reality’ – that is R2P advocates must work within an imperfect world and UN
system where this revolutionary idea remains an essentially contested concept.
Attempts to create a legal entrapment for states out of a hodgepodge of
international treaties and newly emerging norms do not actually advance the cause
of R2P.
Legal liability?
Arbour predominantly rests her argument on Article 1 of the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 9 December 1948 (the
Genocide Convention). This is the article which confirms ‘that genocide, whether
committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under international law’
and that signatories to the Convention will ‘undertake to prevent and to punish’.
Arbour’s emphasis is on this last point, noting that this is ‘an undisputed
obligation of international law’.3 This is combined with the decision in the Bosnian
Genocide Case to provide an argument that there has emerged an international
legal ‘duty of care’ when it comes to stopping the crimes outlined in R2P. For
Arbour, the judgement which found that Serbia and Montenegro had failed in its
obligation to prevent Genocide in neighbouring Bosnia, has strong implications for
all states:
Might the judgement [. . .] also carry responsibilities not only for Serbia and its surrogates
in Bosnia Herzegovina, but also to other States parties to the Convention, and indeed to
the wider international community? Certainly the logic of the judgement would suggest
such an assumption.4
She continues this line of reasoning regarding the responsibilities of the great
powers of the Security Council:
If [the responsibility of the Permanent Five Members of the UN Security Council] were to
be measured in accordance with the International Court of Justice’s analysis, it would seem
logical to assume that a failure to act could carry legal consequences and even more so
2 International Court of Justice, Case Concerning the Application of the Application of the Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina vs. Serbia and
Montenegro), General List, no. 91 (26 February 2007), available at: {http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/
files/91/13685.pdf}.
3 Louise Arbour, ‘The responsibility to protect’, p. 450.
4 Ibid., p. 451.
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when the exercise or threat of a veto would block action that is deemed necessary by other
members to avert genocide, or crimes against humanity.5
There are three problems with this line of reasoning. First, The International Court
of Justice’s decision in the Bosnian Genocide Case indicated that responsibility for
the failure to prevent genocide only exists if genocide (or any of the activities
outlined in Article III of the Convention) actually occurs.6 This is relatively
straightforward; it would be bizarre to prosecute a country for failure to prevent
an action which never happens. But given the diﬃculty of actually recognising the
occurrence of genocide as defined in international law, this also seems highly
problematic. That ICJ judges recently rejected Prosecutor Luis Moreno Ocampo’s
argument to charge Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir with genocide because
there was not enough evidence is a good example of this.7 The crime of genocide
requires proof of a special intent (dolus specialis) whereby the crimes committed
must be done with the intent ‘to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical,
racial or religious group’. Without evidence of this special intent, genocide, by
definition, cannot be said to be taking place. Bashir is, of course, accused of other
international crimes, but, significantly, there seems to be a serious problem with
Arbour’s argument if the starting point for her obligation is frequently diﬃcult and
sometimes impossible to apply given its tricky definition.
To be clear, this is not to imply that the declaration of genocide must be ex post
facto. The ICJ found that the plausible risk of genocide was suﬃcient to trigger a
duty to prevent.8 However, this does not take away from the fact that the risk must
actually be ‘real’ (as far as risks can be). Yet the Court did not really indicate as
to how such a determination was to be made or which criteria were to be used. The
judgment does say that the Serbian government ‘could hardly have been unaware
of the serious risk’ of genocide, and refers to facts that certain government oﬃcials
likely knew that certain actions were going be taken as evidence.9 Whether or not
this constitutes a legal standard is not clear – or if it does, it remains a vague one.
Therefore, the contention here is that the fundamental problem of determining the
risk or existence of a genocide in order to trigger an international legal obligation
to prevent largely remains.
Secondly, the ICJ recognised that the Genocide Convention is not the only legal
instrument which creates a legal obligation for an activity for states to prevent.
Rather, there are similar obligations for states to take measures against torture,
harm against internationally protected persons and terrorism.10 However, the
5 Arbour, Ibid., p. 453.
6 Judgement, para. 431.
7 Although the judges argued that these charges could be reinstated with more evidence. On appeal
genocide charges were issued against al-Bashir in a second warrant in July 2010. See the press release
‘Pre-Trial Chamber I issues a second warrant of arrest against Omar al-Bashir for counts of
genocide’, International Criminal Court website (12 July 2010). Available at: {http://www.icc-cpi.int/
NR/exeres/E9BD8B9F-4076–4F7C-9CAC-E489F1C127D9.htm}.
8 Judgment, para. 430.
9 Ibid., para. 436.
10 Specifically, the Court acknowledged: the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment of 10 December 1984 (Article 2); the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplo-
matic Agents, of 14 December 1973 (Article 4); the Convention on the Safety of UN and Associated
Personnel of 9 December 1994 (Article 11); the International Convention on the Suppression of
Terrorist Bombings of 15 December 1997 (Article 15). Judgement, para. 429.
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Court limited its judgement in an important ways that Arbour does not seem to
acknowledge. The Court was clear that it did not ‘purport to establish a general
jurisprudence applicable to all cases where a treaty instrument, or other binding
legal norm, includes an obligation for States to prevent certain acts.’ Additionally,
the Court refrained from finding that ‘apart from the texts applicable to specific
fields, there is a general obligation on States to prevent the commission by other
persons or entities of acts contrary to certain norms of general international law.’
Therefore, the Court confined itself to making its determination in the Bosnian
Genocide Case to ‘the specific scope of the duty to prevent in the Genocide
Convention’. The application of the decision to create a legal principle of R2P
seems contrary to the Court’s pronouncement.11
Consequently, the level of precedent-setting for this decision, at least in the way
that Arbour wants to use it, is very questionable. In fact, it is very strange that she
relies on the judgement so heavily after such a warning by the Court was given.
That international lawyers are often creative in their uses of the law or in their
interpretations is one thing, but in this case, the Court seems rather clear about its
intention and on the limitations of its judgement. While it is, perhaps, indicative
of the kinds of findings the ICJ or other international criminal tribunals may
produce in the future, Arbour should have been clearer about the Court’s position
on the uses of the judgement and her intention in invoking the decision as a basis
of her claims.
Finally, and this is, perhaps, the most straightforward critique, is that while
there can be little doubt that the Convention states that parties undertake to
prevent genocide, the guidance as to what exactly ‘prevent’ means is not
particularly useful. The Convention states that any contracting party may ‘call
upon the competent organs of the UN to take such action under the Charter of
the UN as they consider appropriate.’12 In other words, ‘prevention’ in the
Convention is understood as bringing the matter back to the UN Security Council
and General Assembly – the very problematic (or at least ineﬀective) forums which
R2P advocates are seemingly trying to cajole into action. This is even more so in
highly politicised cases which may divide the international community.
Additionally, there is no guidance as to who should make a determination that
genocide is to take place, who should prevent it and what kind of international
approval they would need. As Arbour points out, the Court did oﬀer some
guidance on these issues – but essentially this amounts to vague calculations of an
obligation arising ‘at the instant that the State learns of, or should normally have
learned of, the existence of a serious risk that genocide will be committed.’13 As for
who should do the intervening, the Court in the Bosnian Genocide Case suggests
a fuzzy combination of factors comprising a ‘capacity to influence’ made up of
geographical proximity, political links, ‘as well as links of all other kinds, between
the authorities of that State and the main actors in the events’.14 Despite Arbour’s
assertions, the reality is that this list is not very specific and not very helpful.
Certainly none of this seems to constitute a clear, direct nor novel legal standard.
11 Judgement, para. 429.
12 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Article VIII.
13 Judgement, para. 431.
14 Judgement, para. 430.
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The hard part
But this brings us to the second major critique of Arbour’s argument – that even
if a legal obligation could be established, the model that Arbour suggests is not
helpful because such an obligation could not truly provide any guidance on the
‘tough’ questions about R2P. Just some of these questions include exactly who may
intervene, under what kind of mandate, for how long and where – questions which
have plagued debates over humanitarian intervention for decades. Can inter-
national law really help us answer them?
Two points may be raised here which suggest not. First, it is one thing to
establish a law, principle or even a norm – it is quite another to change practices.
As the saying has it, ‘old habits die hard’ – and this is also true for international
bodies like the UN. As Alex J. Bellamy (a strong R2P advocate) writes, even when
the international community is armed with criteria:
[D]ecisions about intervention will continue to be made in an ad hoc fashion by political
leaders balancing national interests, legal consideration, world opinion, perceived costs and
humanitarian impulses – much as they were prior to the advent of R2P.15
If we have learned anything about international law in the last 20 years, if not the
last century, it is that its existence rarely delivers consensus.
Yet, for the sake of argument (and the second point), let us assume that
Arbour’s case for the establishment of a ‘duty of care’ is broadly accepted by the
international community. Other than establishing this liability, what else does
Arbour’s argument help us decide about R2P? The answer is not much. Of course
establishing that states now have a burden to ‘take action under the doctrine of
responsibility to protect’16 might be a small step forward, but other than this, it
does not help international society answer the really diﬃcult questions concerning
the commitment required of states or over authorisation and participation.
Bellamy suggests that there are at least four major problems with prevention in
terms of R2P: (1) it is diﬃcult to discern measures which are directed specifically
at preventing the international crimes listed by R2P (genocide, war crimes, crimes
against humanity and ethnic cleansing) and those which relate more broadly to
conflict prevention more generally; (2) there is an absence of limits on what exactly
constitutes prevention (which may make states reluctant to commit themselves); (3)
do preventative measures lead to additional encroachments on sovereignty; and (4)
who should do the prevention work? As it stands the doctrine is unclear as to what
sorts of agencies should take the lead.17
The establishment of a duty of care under a doctrine of R2P does not help
establish answers to these questions. While the decision in the Bosnian Genocide
Case does provide some rough guidance (as discussed above), this is of much less
use and direction than Arbour implies. Bellamy suggests that part of the problem
is that the understanding of ‘prevention’ in the 2001 R2P report issued by the
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) was
concerned with internal wars more generally as well as other man-made crises
15 Alex J. Bellamy, Responsibility to Protect: The Global Eﬀort to End Mass Attrocities (Cambridge:
Polity, 2009). p. 3.
16 Arbour, ‘The responsibility to protect’, p. 449.
17 Bellamy, Responsibility to Protect, pp. 99–100.
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compared to the rather narrow international criminal focus in the 2005 World
Summit outcome document.18 The prevention requirements of the former under-
standing of R2P would, out of necessity, require a much wider focus, but whether
this could be said for genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, etc., is questionable.
This is not to say that the Court’s judgment rendered the understanding of
Article 1 of the Genocide Convention less clear or more confusing. Rather, it is to
suggest that the Court’s judgment may be significantly less novel and important
that what Arbour is suggesting in her argument. If R2P is to become some sort of
basis for international action or transformed into a legal principle, (based on
Arbour’s reading of the Judgment in Bosnia vs. Serbia) the questions outlined
above are the ones that international lawyers will still have to wrangle with. In this
way, Arbour’s obligation seems to be little more than papering over a giant chasm
of disagreements between R2P stakeholders. With all of the right intentions, it is
still a roadmap to nowhere that gets us only a little past the first of many, many
intersections.
Realistic R2P?
Answers, or compromise solutions, to these diﬃcult questions will probably not be
worked out in law so much as they will be determined through negotiations at
various international organisations. This is something I am sure Arbour is aware
of. Yet, a third line of critique which can be raised against her assertions is that
Arbour is, at the very least, ignoring certain facts of world politics to the great
detriment of her argument. At the end of the day the eﬀective realisation of her
legal thought-experiment entails a remaking of the world order. If nothing else, it
would require a further revolution in the notion of state sovereignty – certainly
beyond that which the Non-Aligned Movement and certain great powers like the
US would be comfortable with.19 There can be no question that R2P is a
revolution in the notion of ‘sovereignty’, but translating this into a legally
enforceable responsibility is, politically speaking, taking R2P to a whole new level.
Whether such a revolution could be brought about in the present day and age by
a group of lawyers and R2P advocates is highly suspect. Certainly a fairly small
group of diplomats, politicians, international bureaucrats and activists were highly
successful in getting the issue on the agenda at the 2005 World Summit. However,
the long and arduous process of negotiation process required to get a very slimmed
down version of R2P (derisively or depressingly referred to as ‘R2P Lite’) in the
World Summit Outcome document as well as certain scepticism over the concept
suggests that, at least for now, there are limits as to how far the doctrine can go.
As Gareth Evans has written, by 2008 the Latin American, Arab and African
delegates to the UN’s budget committee flatly denied that R2P was even ever
adopted by the General Assembly.20
18 Bellamy, Responsibility to Protect, p. 100.
19 In speaking oﬀ-record with government oﬃcials from the UK and US familiar with this issue and
in a position to know, they all remarked that their governments would not have signed the World
Summit Outcome Document if they felt it created a legal obligation for their state to intervene in
a crisis. Interviews conducted by the author, London/Washington 2009.
20 Gareth Evans, ‘The Responsibility to Protect: An Idea Whose Time Has Come . . . and Gone?’,
International Relations, 22:3 (2008), pp. 283–298, 288.
52 Stephanie Carvin
Is it then fair to speak of a ‘responsibility to reality’? Reality is, of course,
subjective and notoriously hard to judge. However, what does seem to be very
clear is the fact that R2P advocates are going to have to work within a political
system to achieve their goals rather than creating contrived legal obligations
through stringing together vague and unenforceable laws and/or case law. It is very
much a political system that allows for much scepticism, obstruction and provides
for a lot of frustration. Yet, that some lawyers, like Arbour, often seem to want
to leap over this international political system through asserting a supposedly
neutral law is not, in the end, helping their cause. Additionally, it is not helping
to solve the larger problems posed by the issues of sovereignty and intervention in
the 21st Century. After its adoption by the World Summit in 2005 and the Security
Council (Resolution 1674) in 2006, it is fair to say that R2P is an emerging
principle in international society. Even better, it may yet work in creating a
common language in which action may be debated and plans to help solve some
of the world’s worst problems may be asserted. R2P may actually work – but it
is diﬃcult to imagine that it will work in such a way as to eﬀectively trap states
into obligations into which they have not given their consent.
During the negotiation process leading up to the World Summit, the US
consistently resisted the argument that the international obligation to protect was
on the same level as the domestic duty of states. The notion that the Security
Council could also be legally obliged to intervene was also criticised with then-US
Ambassador to the UN John Bolton asserting that there needed to be the freedom
to decide on courses of action on a case-by-case basis:
The UN member states recognised their responsibility to protect their own citizens but did
not recognise a responsibility to act beyond using peaceful means in cases of mass killing,
genocide and ethnic cleansing. Instead, they simply reaﬃrmed their preparedness to use
other measures if they saw fit – a significantly lower standard.21
If, as Bellamy suggests, the problem with humanitarian intervention is one of
willingness rather than ability or even obligation to do so, asserting that a legal
duty of care exists will accomplish little. The problem of ‘will’ should be
understood as a problem of politics and not a problem of law.
Conclusion
Ultimately, the intention in this article is to not be defeatist but pragmatic. There
can be little doubt that engagement with states on the brink of major catastrophe
is good for all involved. The great hope of R2P is that it will provide a language
for debate when it comes to addressing genocide and war crimes. Still, given these
dilemmas that will inevitably arise, I do not think that sending in the lawyers is a
good solution.
The diﬃculties of Arbour’s argument go beyond a general concern as to what
is the best approach for implementing R2P. It rests on particular interpretations of
both the Genocide Convention and international criminal law that are far from
unimpeachable. But even if we were to allow for Arbour’s legal argument, it is
21 Bellamy, The Responsibility to Protect, p. 90.
A responsibility to reality 53
questionable as to how useful the founding of such an obligation would be for the
international community.
It is not that establishing a legal obligation would hinder the implementation
of R2P. Rather, the argument here is that Arbour’s legal construction really does
not bring anything new (that is practical) to the table. In truth, given its 2005
manifestation in the World Outcome Document, this may be a critique that could
be levied at R2P in general – that, as indicated above, it does little else than
provide a new vocabulary in which to discuss old issues.
However, keeping the focus on Arbour, it is clear that the supposed novelty of
her argument is to suggest that states are under a legally enforceable ‘duty of care’
to which they may be held to account in cases of genocide and crimes against
humanity. A summary of a response here is that such an obligation cannot really
be said to legally exist. Additionally, such an obligation, even if it did exist, would
not be particularly useful because other than establishing a ‘duty’, it does not really
answer the ‘hard questions’ of R2P (such as who may or must intervene, where,
when and under whose mandate). These are the giant obstacles that have thus far
prevented meaningful action in cases where human security is threatened.
Of course, Arbour does not suggest that the judgment in Bosnia vs. Serbia and
its implications will solve all political problems related to intervention and R2P.
However, it is clear that she feels that such a legal obligation oﬀers new norms,
guidance and obligations in international society for states, particularly powerful
states, faced with the possibility of a case of genocide. Arbour’s contention that
states are now under a legal ‘duty of care’ to prevent and punish genocide and
crimes against humanity, can therefore be read as a radical theoretical challenge to
notions of sovereignty and the understanding of the responsibility of states.
But practically speaking, her proposal does not add much in the way of clarity
or usefulness in answering the tough questions of R2P. In addition, such an
obligation would, without a doubt, be rejected by states who continue to be
caught-up in the deficient practice of international politics and their own
self-interest. This is particularly so when one considers that any fulfilment of her
legal proposition is likely to bring the matter right back to the very institutions
which have thus far proved inept and ineﬀective at preventing threats to human
security, particularly the UN. In this sense, Arbour’s argument actually becomes
less novel and perhaps an almost tragic idea. The establishment of legal liability on
neighbours or great powers will not get bickering states past the big challenges of
R2P, such as what constitutes ‘prevention’?, who is responsible?, and what may be
done to eﬀectively carry out ‘prevention’ while working within the framework of
the UN Charter? Such challenges will likely be solved in an ad hoc manner, in
times of urgency, by less-than-perfect international political forums. Advocates of
a realistic responsibility would do well to keep this in mind.
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